Who is collingwood

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Some statements can play different roles. They may be both propositional answers to questions and presuppositions which give rise to questions.

Philosophical analysis is concerned with a special kind of presupposition, one which has only one role in the logic of question and answer, namely that of giving rise to questions. Absolute presuppositions are foundational assumptions that enable certain lines of questioning but are not themselves open to scrutiny.

The three senses of causation discussed above are examples of absolute presuppositions which structure different forms of inquiry. A physician, for example, absolutely presupposes sense II of causation, according which a cause is. Qua practical scientist of nature, the physician absolutely presupposes a handle or manipulability conception of causation which makes it possible to intervene in nature to achieve certain intended results, i.

The presupposition is absolute because it could not be questioned without at the same time undermining the kind of inquiry it makes possible. Absolute presuppositions in this respect differ from relative presuppositions. A physician prescribes a dose of aspirin on the assumption it will cause a patient to break into a sweat. This presupposition is relative because it could potentially be overthrown by future research. But the underlying conception of causation is a condition sine qua non for practising medicine.

It is these absolute presuppositions that philosophy seeks to uncover by regressing from propositional answers to the questions they are answers to, and from the questions to the presuppositions which must be made for the questions to arise. He illustrates this explanatory pluralism by imagining a scenario in which a car stops while driving up a steep hill. As the driver stands by the side of the road a passerby, who happens to be a theoretical physicist offers his help.

The car, he explains, has stopped because. The first explanation invokes the sense of causation that belongs to the theoretical sciences of nature, sense III. The second explanation invokes the sense of causation that belongs to the practical sciences of nature, sense II.

The choice between these explanations, for Collingwood is determined by the nature of the question asked. As he puts it:. If I had been a person who could flatten out hills by stamping on them the passerby would have been right to call my attention to the hill as the cause of the stoppage; not because the hill was a hill but because I was able to flatten it out.

This scenario illustrates that there are different explanations, corresponding to different senses of causation, each answering a different kind of question. When the different senses of causation are disambiguated, then it becomes clear that there is no conflict between the explanation of the theoretical physicist and that of the car mechanic, because they answer different kinds of questions, questions which differ because they are entailed by different absolute presuppositions.

Explanations genuinely conflict with one another only if they provide answers to the same question, but they do not if they are answering different questions. The task of presuppositional analysis is to undo the conceptual knots in which our thoughts get tangled when we mix and match answers of one kind with questions of another by failing to see the entailment relations which hold between presuppositions, the question to which they give rise, and the sort of propositional answers which address those questions:.

In unscientific thinking our thoughts are coagulated into knots and tangles; we fish up a thought out of our minds like an anchor foul of its own cable, hanging upside-down and draped in seaweed with shellfish sticking to it and dump the whole thing on deck quite pleased with ourselves for having got it up at all.

Thinking scientifically means disentangling all this mess, and reducing a knot of thoughts in which everything sticks together anyhow to a system or series of thoughts in which thinking the thoughts is at the same time thinking the connexions between them.

EM 22— The logical inquiry into the connections holding between presuppositions, questions and answers is the true task of conceptual analysis in metaphysics, a task that must replace metaphysics traditionally understood as the study of pure being.

There is no such thing as knowledge of pure being because there can be no presuppositionless knowledge and there can be no presuppositionless knowledge because all knowledge is pursued in answer to questions and no question could arise if no presuppositions were made.

Failure to recognise that knowledge rests on presuppositions encourages the belief that pure being is a possible object of knowledge. Traditionally it was metaphysics that was deemed to be the science of pure being. In the aftermath of the scientific revolution this role was increasingly claimed by the most fundamental of the sciences: physics.

Philosophy does not conflict with natural science because it does not advance claims about the nature of reality but about the presuppositions under which all sciences, including natural science, operate. Nor is there conflict between natural science and other forms of knowledge because different forms of knowledge answer different kinds of questions, questions which arise from different presuppositions. Hume had argued that inductive inferences rely on the principle of the uniformity of nature.

The principle of the uniformity of nature, Collingwood argues, is not a proposition, but an absolute presupposition, one which cannot be denied without undermining empirical science. As it is an absolute presupposition the notion of verifiability does not apply to it because it does its job not in so far as it is true, or even believed to be true, but in so far as it is presupposed.

The demand that it should be verified is nonsensical and the question that Hume ask does not therefore arise:. His attempt to disambiguate the different senses of causation in An Essay on Metaphysics seems to be engaging in a task akin to what in An Essay on Philosophical Method he described as the distinguishing of concepts that coincide in their instances. This is because An Essay on Metaphysics contains a fundamental ambiguity. On the one hand it presents presuppositional analysis as the task of regressing from propositional answers to questions and from questions to presuppositions.

This is a logical task aimed at putting order in our thoughts and getting rid of conceptual confusions. On the other hand, it presents presuppositions as historical beliefs thereby suggesting that the goal of presuppositional analysis is not so much to get rid of conceptual confusion as to describe what certain people believed in different periods of time.

Metaphysics, Collingwood says. Statements such as these have a strong historicist flavour. This ambiguity exposes a tension between two different conceptions of the role of philosophical analysis.

On the first conception the task of philosophy is to delineate the subject matters of different forms of knowledge and denounce the encroachment of one form of knowledge on the subject matter of another. The emphasis is on explanatory pluralism, not historical relativism. The defence of the autonomy of historical explanation in The Idea of History , for example, implies that the role of philosophical analysis is to identify the distinctive presuppositions of history and to distinguish them from those of natural science with a view to combating scientism.

The second conception, by contrast, places the emphasis on historical relativism rather than explanatory pluralism. The hypothesis of a historicist turn was first advanced by Malcolm Knox in the editorial introduction to the posthumously published The Idea of History.

It was also endorsed by early commentators such as A. Donagan and , Toulmin and N. Rotenstreich The ontological proof is normally regarded as the pinnacle of metaphysical knowledge, knowledge that is both necessary as a priori knowledge and has existential import as empirical knowledge. Paradoxical as this might sound, he did not seem to think that the ontological proof establishes any substantive ontological conclusions and that it yields the sort of metaphysical knowledge he later explicitly claimed to be impossible.

His concern with the ontological proof was intricately connected with an attempt to delineate the subject matter of philosophical analysis, not the existence of metaphysical entities. This claim may be clarified by saying that philosophical concepts are not contingently instantiated in an empirical class of objects as we have seen, they do not sort things into classes ; they are necessarily instantiated in the forms of judgement or inference which they make possible.

For example, the concept of the good, qua expediency, is necessarily instantiated in hypothetical or instrumental imperatives and the concept of mind is necessarily instantiated in judgements which explain actions qua expression of thought.

This is the kernel of truth that, according to Collingwood, is worth restating in the ontological argument. Such propositions are necessary but not merely hypothetical because the philosophical concepts whose existence they assert are necessarily instantiated in the judgements employed by the practitioners of a given science. The main bone of contention in the correspondence between Ryle and Collingwood was therefore not the ontological argument in its traditional form, but whether or not philosophy has an autonomous domain of inquiry, i.

As we have seen Collingwood later revisited the claim that philosophy has an autonomous domain of inquiry in An Essay on Metaphysics , where he reformulated it by saying that philosophy is not an ontological but a logical enquiry into the presuppositions which govern thought.

Collingwood, for his part, insisted on illustrating what the subject matter of philosophy is, by defending a highly controversial interpretation of what the ontological proof establishes. Be this as it may, the misunderstandings between Collingwood and Ryle show how very difficult it must have been for Collingwood to translate his insights in the language of the burgeoning school of analytic philosophy. In the debate with Ryle which unfolded on the pages of Mind and in the private correspondence Collingwood had tried to defend the claim that there is a distinctive kind of proposition which captures the subject matter of philosophy, but his attempt to capture the distinctive subject matter of philosophical analysis was dismissed by Ryle as being of a piece with a dusty old metaphysics.

This terminological change put Collingwood in a better position to engage with the revival of empiricism at the hands of A. Propositions which are not empirically verifiable are nonsense unless they are tautologies. An Essay on Metaphysics is a pointed attack on the metaphilosophical implications of this claim. Some statements are answers to questions and, in so far as their role is to answer questions, they are truth evaluable. But some statements have a different role, namely, to give rise to questions and they perform this role not in so far as they are true or false, but in so far as they are presupposed.

As such they are not truth evaluable, because they are not asserted as propositional answers to questions. Philosophy yields not first order knowledge but second order knowledge or understanding of the presuppositions on which knowledge rests. Absolute presuppositions are not reducible either to the propositions of the exact or those of the natural sciences. Nor are they ruled out as meaningless propositions by the principle of verifiability because, since they are not propositions, the notion of verifiability does not apply to them.

Collingwood is often referred to as a British idealist, but his allegiance to idealism was in large measure a response to the Oxford realism he had imbibed as a student and continued to profess until around Philosophy is a process of inquiry, not dogmatic positions" Hector This reluctance is probably due to the fact that idealism is most often identified with immaterialism and he would not have wished his criticism of realism to be interpreted as resting on a commitment to the claim that the real is ideal or that mind is causally responsible for the existence of reality.

If the contrast between idealism and realism is understood as one between two metaphysical views concerning the ontological constitution of reality is it mental? Is it material? Collingwood had nothing to contribute to the debate between realists and idealists; he would have regarded it as belonging to metaphysics as the study of pure being, not as metaphysics understood as a form of presuppositional analysis.

Denying realism, so understood, is to deny that there can be any such thing as knowledge of pure being. Since all knowledge takes the form of answers to questions, and all questions rest on presuppositions, knowledge necessarily has presuppositions. Kant did not deny that talk about knowledge of things as they are in themselves is coherent; he simply claimed that this sort of knowledge is unavailable to us.

Presuppositionless knowledge is not a kind of knowledge that it is not possible for us to acquire but may be available to another being, such as God: the idea of presuppositionless knowledge involves an oxymoron because all knowing involves presuppositions. While An Essay on Metaphysics explained, in the most general terms, what presuppositional analysis is, The Idea of History and The Principles of History seek to uncover the presuppositions governing historical inquiry into the past.

He is not advancing a theory concerning the nature of time, whether, for example, it is ever-present or a growing block. Nor is it primarily an epistemological concern with the question of how one acquires knowledge of the past, given that it is not available for observation, although he does address some epistemological questions.

What does it mean to understand the past historically? The historical past is the past understood historically , i. The past in so far as it is understood historically the historical past is therefore not the same thing as the past as it is studied by a natural scientist.

IH While both the geologist and the historian are concerned with the past, the questions that they ask and the presuppositions which give rise to those questions are different. Scientific inquiry rests on the presupposition of the uniformity of nature. This principle is required to formulate the inductive hypotheses which enable empirical scientists to predict what will happen in the future and retrodict what happened in the past.

But while this presupposition is well suited to serve the explanatory goals of natural science, it is of limited use to historians who are concerned not with what is invariant throughout history, but with what is distinctive about different periods of time. It would not help an Egyptologist to understand the rituals of the ancient Egyptian to ascribe them the mindset of a medieval feudal baron. As Collingwood puts it:. Types of behaviour do, no doubt, recur, so long as minds of the same kind are placed in the same kind of situations.

The behaviour-patterns characteristic of a feudal baron were no doubt fairly constant so long as there were feudal barons living in a feudal society. But they will be sought in vain except by an inquirer content with the loosest and most fanciful analogies in a world whose social structure is of another kind. In order that behaviour-patterns may be constant, there must be in existence a social order which recurrently produces situations of a certain kind.

But social orders are historical facts, and subject to inevitable change, fast or slow. A positive science of mind will, no doubt, be able to establish uniformities and recurrences, but it can have no guarantee that the laws it establishes will hold good beyond the historical period from which its facts are drawn.

IH — Collingwood is critical of those philosophers who, like Bradley , bring the presuppositions of natural science to bear upon the study of the historical past. It is not the role of historians to dismiss as false the testimony of historical agents who attest to the occurrence of miracles on the grounds that since nature is uniform and its laws do not change, the miracles past agents attested to could not have happened because their occurrence contravenes the laws of nature.

This is not to say that historians need to believe that miracles happened in order to understand the sources, but rather that understanding the role that belief in the supernatural had for the agents who witnessed to them is more important for the historian than assessing whether belief in the supernatural is true or false:.

Face facts, and realize there are no dangers in the mountains except rocks and water and snow, wolves perhaps, and bad men perhaps, but no devils. But the devil-fearer says that the presence of devils is a fact, because that is the way in which he has been taught to think. The historian thinks it a wrong way; but wrong ways of thinking are just as much historical facts as right ones, and, no less than they, determine the situation always a thought-situation in which the man who shares them is placed.

What makes an investigation historical , therefore, is not simply the fact that it is focused on the past, but the kind of concerns by which it is guided when investigating the past. To understand past agents is to understand the way in which they reasoned, the inferences that they drew, the conceptual connections which they made, the symbolic significance they attached to certain events.

This is what differentiates a concern with the historical past from a concern with the natural past:. The historian, investigating an event in the past, makes a distinction between what may be called the outside and the inside of an event. By the outside of the event I mean everything belonging to it which can be described in terms of bodies and their movements: the passage of Caesar, accompanied by certain men, across a river called the Rubicon at one date, or the spilling of his blood across the floor of the senate-house at another.

The historian is never concerned with either of these to the exclusion of the other. He is investigating not mere events where by a mere event I mean one which has only an outside and no inside but actions, and an action is the unity of the outside and the inside of an event. Understanding actions historically requires understanding them more like responses to commands that may be followed or disregarded, than as instances or counter instances of empirical laws.

When understood historically, therefore, the actions of past agents are explained more in the manner in which one understands the action of a motorist who stops at a traffic light i. The mindset of past agents cannot be investigated under the presupposition which governs empirical science, i. The distinction between the historical past and the natural past corresponds to the distinction between the subject matters of the sciences of mind and nature: the former study actions, in so far as they explain what happens as an expression of thought, the latter study events insofar as they approach their subject matter as instantiating certain observable patterns.

Collingwood captured the distinction between actions and events by claiming that the former have an inside which the latter lack IH The point of this claim was to draw attention to the fact that the meaning or significance of an action eludes nomological explanations which account for what happens by subsuming their explanandum under general laws.

This metaphor has unfortunately sometimes been read literally, leading to Collingwood being unfairly attacked for defending the view that the subject matter of history is an internal, unobservable psychological process and for putting forward an equally implausible method for accessing it: re-enactment.

The task of historians is not to establish that a past event had to happen in the past, in a way analogous to that in which a scientist predicts that a solar eclipse will happen in the future, but to re-enact the thoughts of historical agents. Collingwood claims that when historians re-enact the thought of an historical agent, they do not re-enact a thought of a similar kind but the very same thought as the agent. This claim has often been regarded as counterintuitive because to say that the thought of the agent and that of the historian are one and the same appears to presuppose that there is only one rather than two numerically distinct acts of thought: that of the historian and that of the agent.

Acts of thinking are individuated and distinguished from one another by adopting spatial criteria. Sal Perna has moved from investigating Darren Weir to putting his hand up to help Collingwood. And he managed to form a bond with a player he used to idolise. Gold Coast dropped a bomb when it announced it was delisting Hugh Greenwood, one of its best and most reliable players. When will he return for pre-season training? Huge changes are coming at Collingwood and there will be some big-name casualties.

But at least a few current board members will survive the carnage. But what is Collingwood thinking? Collingwood player Jordan De Goey has taken to social media to address his arrest in New York City for the first time.

Collingwood player Jordan de Goey has been spotted for the first time since he was arrested and charged with assault in New York. Jordan De Goey may have been stood down by Collingwood indefinitely — but his Aussie mate and co-accused Luke Dyson has returned to his day job. Jordan De Goey may have had serious charges in his assault case dropped, but his Australian friend Luke Dyson appears to be lapping up New York City life.

There have been changes to the serious assault charges against Collingwood superstar Jordan De Goey after he was arrested at a a New York nightclub. AFL players might struggle to head out in Melbourne without being recognised, but it was a different story for Jordan De Goey in New York, with one news outlet referring to him as a rugby player. A celebrity law firm whose founder has defended Harvey Weinstein and was name-checked in a Jay-Z verse has been hired by the Aussie footy star in his NYC assault case.